



## Model-based control of spatiotemporal epidemics using latent processes

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## Summary

- Spatio-temporal stochastic models for informing control strategies
- Formulation of posterior measures for guiding control strategy
- Use of functional-model representations (noncentered parameterisations) for efficient comparison
- Conclusions where to look for infection to maximise impact of control?



## **Generic problem**

Observation of emerging epidemic

How should subsequent survey/control be designed in order to achieve a desired goal given available resources?



Citrus canker epidemic: Dade County, Miami, Florida



 $S \rightarrow E$ : If *j* is in state *S* at time *t*, then  $\P$ 

 $Pr(j \text{ exposed } (t, t+dt)) = (\varepsilon + \beta \Sigma_i K(d_{ij}, \alpha))dt + o(dt)$ 

 $E \rightarrow I: T_{E}^{j} \sim \pi_{\theta_{E}}^{E} \qquad (random sojourn time in E)$  $I \rightarrow R: T_{I}^{j} \sim \pi_{\theta_{I}}^{I} \qquad (random sojourn time in I)$  $Parameters: <math>\theta = (\varepsilon, \beta, \kappa, \theta_{E}, \theta_{I})$ 

Here we focus on simpler SI model with cryptic infections – infections only become symptomatic after fixed (known) period  $\Delta$  (c.f. Neri et al (2014)).



### **Eradication strategy – ring culling**



- Attempts to control Miami urban epidemic used a 1900ft eradication radius
- Model-based predictions of effective radius strongly dependent on choice of spatial kernel



## Model fitting in Bayesian framework

- For 'complete' data *x(T)* (e.g. times and nature of all transitions up to time *T*) π(*x* | θ) tractable
- Given censored/filtered/noisy data y, π(y | θ) typically intractable
- Use data augmentation and sample from  $\pi(\theta, \mathbf{x}(T) | \mathbf{y}) \propto \pi(\theta) \pi(\mathbf{x}(T), \mathbf{y} | \theta)$  using e.g. MCMC
- Updating x often requires reversible-jump techniques given variable dimension

(See e.g. GJG, 1997, O'Neill & Roberts, 1999, Streftaris & GJG, 2004, Forrester *et al.*, 2007, GJG *et al.*, 2006, Chis-Ster *et al.* 2008, Starr *et al.* 2009, Jewell & Roberts, 2007, Neri *et al.*, 2014, Lau *et al.*, 2015)

#### HERIOT WATT Functional-model representations



Functional models (Dawid & Stone, 1983)

Consider outcome as deterministic function  $h(q, \theta)$  where q has known distribution independent of  $\theta$ .

In model choice q can be used as a latent residual process.

Investigating  $\pi(\theta, q | \mathbf{y})$  rather than  $\pi(\theta, \mathbf{x} | \mathbf{y})$  facilitates model assessment via latent classical tests.

Here we extend the idea to formulate models for epidemic dynamics in the presence of control d, so that  $x = h^*(q, \theta, d)$ .

Assigns threshold  $q_i$  to each individual. If  $R_i(t)$  denotes infectious challenge to *i* at time *t*, infection time  $x_i$  occurs when integrated challenge reaches threshold

Sellke Construction (Sellke, 1983)

$$q_i = \int_0^{x_i} R_i(t) dt \sim \mathsf{Exp}(1)$$

•Epidemic dynamics specified (for SI with cryptic) by  $\underline{q}$  (vector of Sellke Thresholds) and  $\theta$ , i.e. ( $\mathbf{x} = h(\underline{q}, \theta)$ ).

•For controls *d*, <u>based on removal of infected individuals</u>, it follows that  $\mathbf{x} = h^*(\underline{q}, \theta, d)$ .

• Gives a means of <u>coupling</u> epidemic trajectories <u>under different</u> <u>control strategies</u>.



- Based on removal of hosts found to be infected at control time t<sub>c</sub> (by perfect diagnostic test if not obviously infected).
- *N*′hosts can be targeted (resource constraint)
- Impact assessed at time  $T_A e.g.$  via number of infections occurring by  $T_A$ .

$$\underline{v}$$
  $t_{obs}$   $t_c$   $T_A$   
Observation of  
emerging epidemic



## Which hosts *j* to target?

Based on  $E(G_M(\mathbf{x}(t), j) | \mathbf{y})$  at some time  $t = t_M \ge t_{obs}$ 

Measure calculated on host Host index Epidemic trajectory up to t.

**Candidate measures -** (*x<sub>j</sub>* denotes infection time of *j*)

 $G_R(x(t), j) = I_{\{xj < t\}}$ - 'Risk'

 $G_{H}(\mathbf{x}(t), j) = \sum_{x_{i} > t, i \neq j} \beta K(d_{ij}, \alpha)$  - 'Hazard'

 $G_T(\mathbf{x}(t), j) = G_R(\mathbf{x}(t), j) \times G_H(\mathbf{x}(t), j)$  - 'Threat'



- Use random sample from π(θ, x(t) | y) to generate sample of size m from π(θ, q | y).
- Let u(x(T)) denote the number of infections by time T for trajectory x(T). Let d denote control strategy.

$$\mathbf{x}(T) = h(\theta, \mathbf{q}), \qquad \mathbf{x}_{d}(T) = h^{*}(\theta, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{d})$$

 $\mathsf{EER}(d) = -\Sigma_i \{ u(h^*(\theta_i, \mathbf{q}_i, d)) - u(h(\theta_i, \mathbf{q}_i)) \} / m$ 

Here we take *m* = 1000 draws (θ<sub>i</sub>, q<sub>i</sub>) from π(θ, q |y), using these as a test-bed of 'pre-epidemics' on which to compare controls.

# HERIOT Simulation: non-clustered

#### Simulated epidemic: Uniformly distributed population, primary + exponential kernel



Parameters  $\Delta$  = 100,  $\alpha$  = 0.08,  $\beta$  = 7 x 10<sup>-6</sup>,  $\varepsilon$  = 5 x 10<sup>-5</sup>

Estimated by Neri et al (2014)

Consider application of control applied at t = 460, with impact assessed at t = 500.





Hazard



Threat



#### Hazard, Risk and Threat maps



Threat map marginally more effective that risk map regardless of when measures are estimated.



Citrus location in Broward county (Florida)



- Citrus locations from Dade county
- 1111 trees spatially distributed
- Citrus canker epidemic on this population analysed by Neri et al (2014)
- Canker typically controlled using ringculling strategies (not yet considered in this framework but amenable to it)
- Simulate epidemics of 2 types:
  - exponential kernel with primary
  - exponential kernel no primary

Case	$\alpha$	β	e	$t_{obs}$	Infections observed	Cryptic	Т
(I)	0.08	$7.10^{-6}$	0.00005	460	169	133	500
(II)	0.08	$8.10^{-6}$	0	460	111	124	500





Parameters  $\Delta$  = 100,  $\alpha$  = 0.08,  $\beta$  = 7 x 10<sup>-6</sup>,  $\varepsilon$  = 5 x 10<sup>-5</sup>

Estimated by Neri et al (2014)



(a)

(b)



## Hazard, risk and threat, $t_M = 460$



## **Case I:** $t_M = t_C = 460$



- Threat map gives largest expected reduction
- Effect largest for smaller N' when resources are scarce
- Hazard map generally poorest performance



# Simulated epidemic (no primary, Case 2)



Parameters:  $\alpha = 0.08$ ,  $\beta = 8 \times 10^{-6}$ 

#### **HERIOT** WATT **Risk, hazard and threat maps** at $t_M = 460$

#### Hazard



# 200 m • Symptomatic hosts

Risk

#### Threat



#### **ERIOT** WATT **Case II:** $t_M = t_C = 460$



- Threat map gives largest expected reduction
- Effect largest for smaller N' when resources are scarce
- Reflects differences in hosts appearing at the 'top of the order'

#### HERIOT WATT UNIVERSITY Induced correlation under coupling, epidemic size for N' = 111





- Bayesian framework provides flexible means to design controls using different prioritisation measures
- A strategy which 'locates' the most infections may not be optimal
- In structured populations strategies that prioritise searches using the <u>threat</u> measure may better identify potential 'superspreaders'(?)
- Coupling of epidemics leads to variance reduction, potentially removing need to embed simulation in optimisation routines
- Focus on small population of pre-epidemics makes approach inherently parallelisable



## Next steps

- More complex constrained design spaces
- Applications to 'ring-culling' strategies
- Incorporation of uncertainty in diagnostic tests
- Generalisation of cost functions