

# Accounting for farmers' control decisions into models of pathogen spread through animal trade

#### Lina CRISTANCHO FAJARDO PhD INRAE (MaIAGE - BIOEPAR) Supervision: Elisabeta VERGU, Pauline EZANNO

Currently: MMMI Unit (Institut Pasteur)

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# 1. Context and motivation

Endemic livestock diseases

# 2. Decentralised decision-making: modelling human behaviour

# 3. Application on BVD extension

### 1. Context and motivation Endemic livestock diseases

- Metapopulation network: animal trade network
  - sub-populations: herds
  - movement of individuals: animal exchanges



Figure: Source: Gael Beaunée

• Disease spreading through animal trade has high chances of becoming endemic

- Important economic & animal health impact
- Yet, not as much efforts to eradicate compared to epidemics → control is not compulsory
- Individual management: farmers decide alone  $\implies$  decentralised

### 1. Context and motivation

# **Epidemiological modelling challenges**

• Control on unstructured populations, on non-metapopulation networks or on small networks (e.g. [Perrings et al., 2014])

 $\implies$  large metapopulation network

• Decentralised: control mostly without voluntary decision-making [Wang et al., 2016]

 $\implies$  human behaviour

• Focus on human diseases (barely applied to veterinary epidemiology yet) [Horan et al., 2010] (e.g. [Kuga et al., 2019])

 $\implies$  livestock disease

• Focus on regulated diseases (e.g. [Tago et al., 2016])

 $\implies$  unregulated diseases

modelling human behaviour

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Lina Cristancho Fajardo 🖂, Pauline Ezanno & Elisabeta Vergu

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### Framework

Each farmer j = 1, ..., J searches to make dynamic decisions regarding the adoption of a control measure in his/her own herd, that minimise a cost that depends on the disease spread

$$\min_{a_j^t} \begin{bmatrix} C_{a_j^t}^t(j) \end{bmatrix} \quad ; \quad t = \Delta_d, 2\Delta_d, 3\Delta_d \dots$$

- $a_j^t \in \{0,1\}$ : decision, i.e. control decision taken at decision time t by farmer j
  - 1 (applying the measure at time t)
  - 0 (not applying it)
- $C_{a_i}^t(j)$ : **cost** in herd j associated with the decision  $a_j^t$  taken at time t
  - Stochastic (depends on stochastic disease spread)
  - Unknown cost distribution associated with each possible decision

### Farmer faces a dynamic decision problem under uncertainty

### 2. Decentralised decision-making State of the art

### Main issue

Representing human behaviour in a context of many networked agents

#### Some approaches:

- Evolutionary game-theory (EGT): focuses on the dynamics of strategy change in populations [Smith, 1982].
  - + stochastic & no rationality & cognitive constraints & imitation
  - no learning
- Multi-armed bandits (MAB) [Auer et al., 2002] choose at each time among several possibilities to maximise an expected gain, with uncertainty in the result of the choice in advance.
  - + stochastic, learning, generic formalisation
  - not human decision-maker

### **Our** approach

- Elaboration of an integrative model that couples:
  - Epidemiological-demographic model on a metapopulation network
  - Farmers decision-making component: dynamics of farmers' behaviour regarding the **voluntary** adoption of a **control measure** on the spread of the disease → inspired by EGT and MAB
- Numerical explorations: simulations and sensitivity analyses

# Epidemiological-demographic model

Classic intra-herd stochastic model with demography on a meta-population trade network

- SIR model, frequency-dependence
- Demography (births, deaths)
- Trade network (animal transfers)
- Modeled as: Continuous-time Markov Chain (CTMC)



- $\beta_j$ : infection rate in herd j
- $\gamma$ : recovery rate
- $\tau_j$ : death rate in herd j
- $\mu_j$ : birth rate in herd j
- θ<sub>ji</sub> : trade rate from herd j to herd i

### Algorithm (Farmers' decision-making mechanism)

**Input:** 2 options = {0,1},  $p_1^{\Delta_d}(j) := p_1^{init} \forall j, \kappa \ge 0, \rho \ge 0$ ,  $B(j) = \{i; \theta_{ij} \ne 0 \text{ or } \theta_{ji} \ne 0\}; j = 1, ..., J.$ 

for  $t = \Delta_d, 2\Delta_d, 3\Delta_d...$ 

At each decision time

- for j = 1, ..., J
  - $\blacksquare a_j^t \leftarrow Bernoulli(p_1^t(j))$
  - $C_{a_j^t}^t(j)$   $j^* \leftarrow Unif(B(j))$

 $\ \ \, \bullet \ \, (a_{j^*}^t,C_{a_{j^*}^t}^t(j^*))$ 

Each farmer

Makes decision using current probability of applying the measure Observes associated cost Selects one neighbor in trade network Observes neighbor's decision and cost

■ Updates the probability of applying (*k* = 1) and not applying the measure (*k* = 0)

$$p_{k}^{t+\Delta_{d}}(j) = \frac{p_{k}^{t}(j)e^{-\kappa C_{k}^{t}(j)-\rho C_{k}^{t}(j^{*})}}{p_{k}^{t}(j)e^{-\kappa C_{k}^{t}(j)-\rho C_{k}^{t}(j^{*})} + p_{1-k}^{t}(j)e^{-\kappa C_{1-k}^{t}(j)-\rho C_{1-k}^{t}(j^{*})}}$$

where for  $l = j, j^*$ :  $C_k(l) = 0$  if  $k \neq a_j^t$ .

# Explanation of the algorithm

$$odds_{1}^{t+\Delta_{d}}(j) = \frac{p_{1}^{t+\Delta_{d}}(j)}{p_{0}^{t+\Delta_{d}}(j)} = \frac{p_{1}^{t}(j)e^{-\kappa C_{1}^{t}(j)-\rho C_{1}^{t}(j^{*})}}{p_{0}^{t}(j)e^{-\kappa C_{0}^{t}(j)-\rho C_{0}^{t}(j^{*})}}$$
$$odds_{1}^{t+\Delta_{d}}(j) = odds_{1}^{t}(j) \times e^{(1-2a_{j}^{t})\kappa C_{a_{j}^{t}}^{t}(j)+(1-2a_{j^{*}}^{t})\rho C_{a_{j^{*}}^{t}}^{t}(j^{*})}$$

 $\implies$  Stochastic behaviour, learning, cognitive and social considerations

• j and  $j^*$  vaccinated  $\implies odds_1(j) \ j$  vacc. decrease • j and  $j^*$  did not vaccinate  $\implies odds_1(j)$  vacc. increase<sup>1</sup> • j and  $j^*$  made diff. decisions  $\implies odds_1(j)$  depend on  $\kappa C_1^t(j)$  vs  $\rho C_0^t(j)$  $\rightarrow$  action with lower weighted cost

<sup>1</sup>or stay the same

### A cost function for a given control measure: vaccination

**Vaccine** (partially) protects from infection in ]t;  $t + \Delta_d$ ]

### Cost function of the decision



- $CU_v$  : unitary cost of the vaccine (per animal)
- $CF_v$ : fixed cost of the vaccination (per herd)
- $N_j(t)$  : size of herd j at time t
- r : monetary value of a healthy animal
- $0 \le \phi \le 1$ : rate of reduction of r if animal gets infected
- $N_{S_i \to I_i}(t, t + \Delta_d)$ : no. of infections in herd j over the period
- $\overline{N_j}(t, t + \Delta_d)$  : mean size of herd j over  $[t, t + \Delta_d]$

# Numerical exploration

Fixed setting: 5000 herds, fixed demographic parameters, fixed simulated network structure (scale-free,  $\sim$  Finistère department)

#### Epidemiological parameters (4)

- $1/\gamma = 90$  days (long infection duration)
- local  $R_0 \sim 2.0$
- Epidemic scenario
  - Prop. of infected herds = 0.1
  - Prop. of infected animals = 0.15

#### Economic parameters (4)

- r (healthy animal value)
- $\phi$  (loss of animal value if inf.)
- CF<sub>v</sub> (fixed cost of vacc.)
- $CU_v$  (vaccine cost/animal)

### Decision-related parameters (5)

- Δ<sub>d</sub> (duration of decision and of vacc. efficacy)
- $e_v$  (efficacy of the vaccine)
- $p_1^{init}$  (initial prob. of vacc.)
- κ (sensitivity of the farmer to his/her own cost)
- ρ/κ (ratio of sensitivity of the farmer to the cost of a neighbor and κ)

 $\implies$  13 parameters, studied through Sensitivity Analysis [Saltelli et al., 2008]

### Simulation results Disease spread over 3 years

Proportion of infected herds ( $\kappa = 0.5$  and  $\kappa = 12.5$ )



Farmers' sensitivities to costs,  $\kappa$  and  $\rho(=\kappa/2)$ , determine:

- proportion vaccinating from the second decision time
- how quickly inter-herd prevalence declines.

### SA results (2nd experiment: means of all outputs)

• Epidemiological parameters fixed



- Most influential parameters (main effect)
  - *e<sub>v</sub>* vaccine efficacy (+)
  - $\Delta_d$  decision step (-\*)
  - **\rho\_v^{init} initial probability of vaccinating (+\*)**
- \* impact on limiting disease spread.

# To sum up

- Original integrative model coupling two sub-models:
  - Stochastic disease spread on a meta-population network with demography.
  - Farmer's decision model.
    - Farmer's decision problem
    - Farmer's decision mechanism.
- Model studied through simulations and sensitivity analysis.
- Generic model: other epidemiological models, other control measures
  - $\rightarrow$  Information is transmitted only by trade network

# 4. Application on BVD

#### RESEARCH

### Learning and strategic imitation in modelling farmers' dynamic decisions on Bovine Viral Diarrhoea vaccination

Lina Cristancho-Fajardo<sup>1,2\*</sup>, Elisabeta Vergu<sup>1</sup>, Gaël Beaunée<sup>2</sup>, Sandie Arnoux<sup>2</sup> and Pauline Ezanno<sup>2</sup>

### 4. Application on BVD BVD: Bovine Viral Diarrhoea

#### Consequences: economic, animal well-being



BVD-free and almost BVD-free Introduction in a herd

fandatory control programme

gional or voluntary control

• pasture proximity

• trade



Figure: (Source GDS)

Figure: BVDV control in Europe [Metcalfe, 2019]

#### Within-herd level:

- During gestation: vertical transmission or abortion
- Horizontal transmission

# 4. Application on BVD

### **BVD model** (individual-based stochastic model)

### Between-herd level

- Indirect contact with infected animals in neighbouring herds through pasture (max radius of 2km): 0 to 20 neighbours (6 in average)
- Direct introduction of infected animals through **trade** movements: FCID (French Cattle Identification Database)

### Within-herd level

- Life-cycle dynamics
- Health-state dynamics



#### 4. Application on BVD

# Vaccination and BVD





# 4. Application on BVD Simulation results ( $\kappa = 1$ , $\rho = 0.5$ )



- All information from geographic neighbours seems most useful. In accordance with [Gates et al., 2013, Qi et al., 2019]
- No significant differences when observing only one neighbour

#### 4. Application on BVD

# SA results: varying $\kappa$ ( $\rho/\kappa = 0.5$ )



### Context

- Infectious disease spreading on large metapopulation network
   ⇒ livestock disease on animal trade network
- Dynamic decision-making processes to control spread
  - Decentralised : local control (each farmer)

### Contributions

- Build integrative model for pathogen spread over an animal trade network accounting for farmers' dynamic decision-making regarding the adoption of a health measure
- Extend the integrative model and apply it to a relevant real-life disease (BVD)

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- Evaluate impact of
  - type of network
  - relative temporal scale of the epidemiological and decision-making dynamics
- Perfect information: of scores (centralised) & of costs (decentralised)
  - **I**ssue: unrealistic assumption  $\rightarrow$  information difficult to gather
  - Perspective: consider noisy/partial information
- Separate decision-making processes (centralised vs decentralised)
  - Issue: in reality both farmers & social planner can adopt control measures for the same disease
  - Perspective: coupling centralised-decentralised decision-making
    - Farmers: behaviour adaption? (anticipation)
    - Social planner: incentives for farmers? (subsidies, information platforms)

### Appendix Vaccination decision patterns



(a)  $\kappa = 0.5$ 



(b)  $\kappa = 12.5$ 

# Appendix SA outputs

### Epidemiological

- Proportion of infected herds at final time *T*
- Mean proportion of infected animals at final time *T* (over infected herds at time *T*)
- Proportion of herds infected at least once
- Mean number of new infectious animals in herds that got infected at least once
- Mean rate of new infectious (over susceptible animals) in herds that got infected at least once

### Economic

 Total economic cost of the disease spread

#### Decision-related

- Mean proportion of herds that vaccinate, over the different decision times. Not including first decision
- Proportion of herds according to each vaccination aggregated pattern (without first decision):

   [ never; ≤ half of the time but not never; > half all of the time but not always]

### Epidemiological-decision related (1):

• For each group of herds defined by the vaccination aggregated patterns (without first decision):

Ratio of the cumulative number of new infections over the cumulative number of susceptible animals, for the herds of the pattern that got infected at least once

### Appendix SA results (means of all outputs)





### Appendix SA results (variances of all outputs)





## Appendix BVD model Life-cycle



Figure: YJ (young juvenile), OJ (old juvenile), YFbirth(young fattened from birth), OFbirth(old fattened from birth), G(gestating), NG(non-gestating), Exit(culled)

# Appendix BVD: varying $p_v^{init}$



# Appendix **BVD: varying** $\kappa$ ( $\rho/\kappa = 0.5$ )



# Appendix **BVD: varying** $\kappa$ and $\rho$

